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15. Conclusion 
  
Look around yourselves and you will see evidence 
that Henry George was correct. All of you could have 
probably found easier ways to achieve profit and or 
power; comfort and or repose, than the life tracks you 
have chosen. I’ll guess that a main factor in your choices 
has been a reaction to the need for justice, not merely 
utility in human relations. We need to spread that 
worldview and basis for human action, by giving proper 
respect when we see it in others; in our writings and 
talks and relations. And always remember that morality 
and greater fairness in society are ultimately highly 
utilitarian. People do (and should!) react to being treated 
honestly. The ramifications for their society means that 
justice, in particular basing our money systems in 
fairness, is a highly useful policy. In this process we can 
give those who presently obstruct human development 
for private gain, what they’ve denied to the rest of us, we 
can give them justice too. 
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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the reform of economic institutions 
–those of the market mechanism and the financial 
system, in particular. After introducing the analysis with 
an historical excursus on the development of economic 
institutions, the intent here is to propose significant 
modifications of the present market and financial 
establishments, which despite their radical flavour, will 
be shown to be, in fact, no less pragmatic than 
indispensable to cure the economic maladies of our age. 
Throughout the modern times, all spokesmen of 
powerful institutions –e.g., churches, governments and 
economic elites—have always been keen to recognize in 
principle that these bodies are never perfect, and that 
societies assuredly need to take a step back, so to 
speak, ponder things over and eventually improve them. 
This is exactly what we set out to do in these pages: 
namely, we wish to lay the foundation for such an 
analysis of market developments, and thereafter suggest 
the remedies for making society a workable economic 
proposition. 
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1. Introduction 
This essay analyses a central question of modern 
society: how does one best use ‘the instrument of the 
market’ –this being a basic mechanism of organizational 
efficiency in dynamic economies characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty—, in such a way as to prevent the 
market itself from turning everyone and everything into 
expendable tools, with consequences that are ever more 
disastrous for equity and for human dignity?  
The purpose here is to envisage the possibility and, 
more importantly, the necessity of economic forms 
adapted to human society that are different from those 
that have emerged from the spontaneous transformation 
of the Western world. Persisting in the denial and 
ignorance that such a possibility of change is indeed 
possible will inevitably lead to the (often fanatical) 
conviction that the capitalistic market, with all its 
degenerations and inefficiencies, is the unavoidable, 
even if bitter, outcome of institutional evolution—a 
necessary, teleological fruit of human exertion: ‘the end 
of history’. 
To analyse this topic with the depth and the breath it 
deserves, we will first sketch a brief account of those 
institutions and forms of civilisation that in the course of 
history have promoted the rise and spread of the market, 
eventually making it into an organizational necessity of 
modern economies. This account will be concluded by a 
summary of the pros and cons of the capitalistic market. 
The subsequent step concentrates on the notion of 
competition, and in particular on the role of the 
entrepreneur and the significance of the rate of profit as 
a gauge of accountability. This is essential in order to 
highlight the powers of resilience of the market, and to 
show its flexibility as an organizational tool with regard to 
various kinds of ideological options: for instance we will 
contemplate how it may be extended to either private or 
public systems of ownership. In section 4 we discuss 
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how the market may be turned into a mere mechanism 
for the imputation of costs and efficiency, and this 
discussion is at the heart of the following proposal for a 
non-capitalistic market and the merits of its social 
openness. This argument will then lead directly to the 
treatment of a defining, and fundamental component of 
the system, upon which all reformist propositions 
impinge by necessity: the nature and management of the 
interest rate and the attending financial system. These 
are two dominating and interconnected aspects of 
traditional economic systems that increasingly thwart 
entrepreneurship and stifle production since they are 
predicated on a high concentration of economic power in 
the hands of a social class de facto devoted to 
speculation rather than production. We offer a solution to 
this problem, and conclude the article with a few 
considerations on the international order. 
The goal here is to devise a coherent reformist 
agenda articulated in several key points pertaining to the 
vital nodes of the economic system1. This is just a 
beginning, a first attempt: naturally, given the 
complexities of the issue, the remedies recommended 
are by no means exhaustive, but merely indicative of the 
broad path all humanist forces should undertake 
together in days to come.  
 
2. An Historical Sketch of the Market 
 
In this section, which is devoted to ages in which the 
market was hardly the protagonist, we will identify the 
structural obstacles that impeded the development of 
market relations and the contingencies that eventually 
allowed those relations, in some instances, to rise 
gradually and spread all around. We then consider the 
                                                 
1 The development on the method of social science exposed in 
Fusari (2004) may allow a better understanding of this essay.  
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strong interaction between the growing influence of the 
market and the rapid pace of social transformation, 
which has brought the market to become the essential 
mechanism for efficiency, growth and development. 
In ancient times markets were absent or marginal 
because they were not necessary to the organizational 
efficiency of social systems; rather, as we shall see, the 
market obstructed efficiency. The major role played in 
some ancient societies by individual initiative, critical 
spirit and the propensity to adventure was much more a 
stimulus to creativity, scientific research and geographic 
discovery than it was to the market economy. The 
economy did not hold a central position2 and did not 
attract the interest of students and practical men. Of 
course, the great empires of the ancient world devoted 
considerable resources to hydraulic, monumental and 
military works. However, these were centrally 
administered, authoritarian societies that suffocated 
individual initiative, and in particular mercantile activities. 
Which does not mean that they could not achieve 
wealth, power and social sophistication: in fact, a 
stationary-repetitive economy may be efficiently 
managed by centralized processes and bureaucracy. 
Indeed, the most advanced societies of the ancient 
quasi-stationary world were bureaucratic, autocratic and 
centralized empires, whose neatly ramified branches 
often afforded complete and efficient control over 
extensive regions, avoiding thereby the dissolution and 
fragmentation. 
The crises of the two main commercial empires of the 
ancient world, Cartage and Athens, are good instances 
                                                 
2 In the few ancient societies based on the activities of traders, 
like the Phoenicians and a few other poleis situated on caravan 
routes or along the shore, trading did not engender a 
cumulative development. Such a failure condemned them to 
extinction or subordination.  
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of such a tendency. Those empires were defeated by 
less rich but more highly structured rival powers. The 
organizational inconsistencies of the two empires, the 
avariciousness of their ruling classes, and the 
resentment of their confederates and subjects, all 
represented heavy functional handicaps in the static 
outlook of both systems. But the best illustration of the 
market’s unsuitability to quasi-stationary societies is 
provided by the experience of the Roman Empire from 
Augustus to the Antonines. That empire was governed 
by highly advanced institutions, suitable to the modern 
world and unique in ancient times. An active and efficient 
body of public servants authoritatively administered 
justice, public order and taxation; the remaining public 
functions were assigned to the municipal self-
government of the decurions;3 individual initiative was 
well represented and taxation low. But the major pride of 
the empire, the great Greco-Roman civilization with its 
central idea of circular time, and the marginal role of the 
economy, the running of which depended on the 
polarisation aristocracy-slavery, hindered cumulative 
development and the role of the market.4 The 
persistence of stationarity, hence stagnation, 
transformed the promising decentralized public 
administration of the empire into a factor of dissolution. 
                                                 
3 These were the members of the councils of the urban 
communities, who were vested with deliberative power and 
competence on local finance, building, public works, and public 
utilities. 
4 The enormous economic power of the Roman aristocracy 
grew over time as a partial compensation for the political 
influence subtracted to Senatorial class by the emperors and 
their civil servants. But aristocratic culture disregarded 
economic productivity and influenced the culture of the 
merchant class, and slavery made possible the sustainability of 
such culture. On the other hand, the Christian-Judaic notion of 
linear time was obscured by the dominating civilization. 
90             American Review of Political Economy 
 
So the great crisis of the third century A. C. and an 
extremely painful process of trial and error drove the 
Roman Empire toward the bureaucratically centralized, 
hierarchical society of Diocletian and Constantine the 
Great. In that society, as in the other great empires, the 
market was clearly marginalized. 
The collapse of the Western Empire –which, unlike 
the Eastern provinces, was socially and economically 
dominated by large estate slavery tenancy and a large 
state subsidized urban populace— resulted in a severe 
retrogression in the general conditions of development. 
In this new stage of arrested growth, the body social 
reverted to a primitive structure governed by familial 
links: the quasi-familial relations of loyalty on the part of 
the populace to the descendants of the great Senatorial 
landowning class, or to Germanic military chiefs, 
assumed a basic role. No proper State power came into 
being. The sovereigns of the barbaric states were for the 
most do-nothing kings, controlled by a military 
aristocracy. Nor was there any centralized or autocratic 
empire in fragmented post-imperial Europe. 
Charlemagne’s empire was a kind of “shooting star”. 
After his death, social organization took to the feudal 
model: a world governed by strong and arrogant 
individuals, plunderers more than administrators; as 
Anna Comnena noticed during the transit through the 
Byzantine Empire of Crusaders’ expeditions: these were 
fighters for the faith, but also for spoils and fortune, 
“extremely greedy for any kind of gain.”5  
                                                 
5 See A. Comnena, L’Alessiade  (Stamperia Andrea Molina, 
Milano 1849). Cupidity was very widespread, even among true 
believers. The crusaders of Peter the Hermit devastated the 
Balkans to a surprising degree, pillaging and slaughtering. 
They greedily ventured into Anatolia, too impatient to wait for 
support, and were promptly exterminated. 
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In such turmoil, what became of the market? The 
Western European world dominated by avidity and the 
spirit of independence, and well disposed to adventure, 
favoured a luxuriant efflorescence of mercantile 
activities. The maritime towns were clever at making 
huge profits from the Near-eastern conquests and the 
growing hunger for exotic goods. The medieval 
Communes that followed, carefully created laws, and 
institutions suited to trade, and were resolved to defend 
and extend their independence by fraud, talent and the 
sword. The economy began to take on a central role; it 
now wielded progressively political power and came to 
finance troops and mastermind conquests. Innovations 
became more frequent, and while they might have 
appeared at first to be of little importance, they 
contributed greatly to productive efficiency. Ancient 
Chinese inventions were adopted; others were 
rediscovered in the Arab world, which had been driven 
into decline by Islamic theocracy, despotism and the vice 
and decadence, as deplored by Ibn Khaldun.6 The figure 
of the so-called merchant adventurer arose and the drive 
for discoveries and profit opportunities intensified. 
This triumph of individualism and activism 
contaminated the intellectual milieu of Europe. 
Philosophy and scientific investigation flourished. The 
religious world, cultivated in the monasteries, which held 
a monopoly of knowledge, now began to court 
heterodoxy. The spread of heretical groups and then the 
explosion of the Protestant Reformation made theocracy 
                                                 
6 See Ibn Khaldun (1958). He was a great Arab historian and 
traveller across dar al Islam that lived in the fourteenth century. 
He wrote an important and voluminous history of Arabs, 
Persians and Berbers, in which he fashioned a peculiar theory 
of historical processes. Through his creative analysis he 
identified the cause of the decadence of Arab world in the 
excesses of absolute power, injustice, unproductive 
expenditure, nepotism and corruption. 
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impossible. The idea of linear time, which infused the 
perception of “becoming” and the sense of expectation, 
once it became wedded to a pluralistic, decentralized 
social structure permeated by the individual search for 
material wealth, ended up fertilizing the soil of 
commercial spirit and economic activity. A world open to 
creativity and change wedges its way into history. 
Nevertheless, until the sixteenth century, there was 
no such thing as the self-sustained growth of the 
economy. Despite the progressive build-up of this pre-
modern “dress rehearsal” for capitalism, Western Europe 
was still less developed than China, though it had a key 
advantage: entrepreneurship. In fact, the great 
geographical discoveries of Ming admiral Zheng-Ha in 
the early fifteenth century had no effect on the 
centralized Celestial Empire, hostile as it was to 
businessmen and inclined to isolate itself from the 
outside world. By contrast, the European Age of 
Discovery was an epochal turning point, driven mainly by 
the impetus of merchants and adventurers. The growing 
dimension of the market began strongly to stimulate 
labour division and hence labour productivity. 
Still, the immense flows of resources that 
accompanied those events and the appearance of 
manufactures could not by themselves have averted 
European society’s relapse into quasi-stationary motion 
(even if at a higher level of development), or even 
disintegration and the extinction of creativity, as in 
ancient Greece. This danger was averted thanks to the 
immense contribution of science. Henceforth, economic 
competition would be based even more strongly on 
innovation –Schumpeter’s “creative destruction.” The era 
of industrial society began and capitalism was fully 
established, at last. 
 The rise of a dynamic social system made the 
market a crucial organizational necessity. In fact, it is 
impossible for bureaucracy to govern a dynamic 
Fusari: Non-Capitalist Monetary System             93 
economy, which by definition is characterized by great 
uncertainty, and which needs a steady supply of 
creativity and innovation. Bureaucratic organization 
inevitably leads to the stationary state. Entrepreneurship, 
creativity and innovation need the market, which is the 
sole mechanism that can coordinate a large quantity of 
disconnected initiatives and conflicting decisions in a 
radical state of uncertainty, and eventually assure their 
overall consistency while providing adequate incentives 
for all activities.  
The central role of the economy and the need for the 
market –both of which imply the ontological imperatives 
of individual action, creativity and inquiry— allowed the 
progressive destruction of the centralized, authoritarian 
societies that had submerged the world until modern 
times. The extremely peculiar causes of this turning 
point are well exemplified by the case of Japan: a 
society that, despite many affinities with European 
feudalism and decentralization, was unable to free itself 
from stationary motion but relapsed into a centralized 
Shogun feudalism that lasted until the Meiji revolution of 
the nineteenth century. This result, starkly different from 
that of Western Europe, can only be attributed, primarily, 
to the lack of the capitalistic market.  
 
3. The Capitalist Market 
 
This section focuses on the capitalistic nature of the 
evolutionary process previously discussed. In particular, 
it underlines the initial propulsive strength of the 
capitalistic market and proceeds to single out its growing 
limitations, which appear to form an explosive blend of 
contradiction, discontent and inefficiency in the present 
age. 
In the eighteenth century, Mandeville emphasized the 
role of selfishness and corruption in driving society to 
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prosperity and dynamism.7 Soon after, Adam Smith’s 
economics celebrated the “invisible hand,” a metaphor 
for the combination of the market with individual interest. 
Both were right as commentators of their own era. In 
fact, the robberies and lack of all ethical constraint on 
the part of merchants and entrepreneurs were crucial to 
primitive accumulation; they were the prerequisite for the 
advent of industrial society. Well-governed social orders, 
like the great empires or Tokugawa centralized 
feudalism, were unable to promote endogenous growth, 
which was stimulated above all by the lubricating role of 
the market and self-interest. However, Mandeville and 
Smith went too far in asserting that these phenomena 
represented natural laws.  
 Secularisation proceeded, promoting the theory 
of separation of economics and politics from ethics, and 
thus silenced the grumbling of the moralists. Such 
separation represented an evident scientific error. As a 
matter of fact, social sub-systems always interact: they 
cannot be separated. But the scientific mistake operated 
very well in practice: it eliminated the submission to 
some ethical rules that contradicted various 
organizational and functional necessities of the new, 
modern world. Besides, it stimulated the alluring powers 
of material incentives and the role of the market. This 
drift accelerated the completion of the great march 
towards the open society, which gradually smashed the 
closed and authoritarian civilizations that were still left 
standing. 
The accumulation of financial capital represents a 
central aspect of dynamic economies: an acute hunger 
for capital has accompanied the evolution of capitalism 
                                                 
7He was persuaded that «personal vices may be made useful, 
by a clever government, to the worldly happiness and the 
greatness of the whole» See B. Mandeville, The Fable of the 
Bees (Laterza, Bari, 2000, page 5.)  
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from its first steps. In Medieval time, international traders 
from Italy invented a peculiar institution called 
collegantia to collect the commercial capitals they 
necessitated. Loan at interest and discounting (of 
commercial bills) was diffused in Medieval fairs. Banking 
system came to know a rapid diffusion. Amsterdam, and 
later London, became the heart of a powerful world 
capital market. The domination of finance capital had 
just started. The management of interest rates became 
the crucial mechanism of the monetary system, and 
speculative activities gradually ousted production from 
center stage.    
The moral impudence of market relations and 
standard financial maneuvers soon began to engender 
disgust and moral disapproval, which were strengthened 
by intensifying exploitation. This development gave birth, 
in the realm of social thought, to a great error, well 
expressed by Polanyi: namely the idea that the market is 
just one of various organizational possibilities and that it 
can therefore be discarded in favour of a different one, 
say, a “redistributive” (Socialist) system. Such a 
conception found expression in a variety of utopian 
designs, which were for the most part fuelled by 
indignation over the infamies of the market and its 
agents, and which all called for the abolition of the latter. 
The aims of anti-market utopia, however, never seemed 
to go beyond the notion of the stationary state and the 
closed society, which ultimately signify regression to 
retarded stages of development. This was shown clearly 
by the most distressing of such utopias, Communism, 
which aimed to eliminate the market but never escaped 
its influence, from the early period of the NEP under 
Lenin’s tyranny up to the recent collapse of all the 
Socialist systems. The methodological equivocations 
afflicting social theory obscured the fact that the market, 
entrepreneurship and individual initiative are simply 
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organizational necessities in modern dynamic 
economies and the open society. 
The only critique of the market based on scientific 
foundations appears to be the analysis on “market 
failure,” according to which, the market is in some 
instances found incapable to act efficiently, in particular 
with reference to public goods, and when market 
demand for goods is insufficient to absorb production. As 
a routine, governments –colluded with business—have 
encouraged a large expansion of public expenditure to 
remedy the deficiency of demand, and therefore allow 
the market to ‘digest’ less troublingly. Yet this routine 
was gravely flawed from the outset: it disregarded the 
efficiency of the public sector and of the public 
administration. This oversight stimulated the birth of an 
alternative approach that emphasized “government 
failure,” which, coupled with the fall of “real Socialism” in 
the East, greatly strengthened the market 
fundamentalists, and thus boosted the advent of the so-
called new economics: a gospel preaching absolute free 
trade and a blind faith in the free market. 
Meanwhile, rapid development of communications 
has allowed market relations to envelop the entire planet 
with thousands of tentacles, transforming the open 
society into a global society. Thus the free market has 
become the owner of the world, with the devastating 
presence of the four modern Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse: distributive iniquity, growing international 
disequilibria, social disintegration, and mass 
unemployment. These phenomena are most acute in the 
underdeveloped countries, but they do not spare even 
the heartland of the free market. In the United States, 
following the trend in the concentration of wealth, the 
difference between the highest and lowest personal 
income groups has almost trebled in the last forty years. 
The earnings of a CEO are almost a thousand times 
those of a simple workman, while public opinion is 
Fusari: Non-Capitalist Monetary System             97 
increasingly concerned over the unspeakable abuses of 
corporate power. The transition in the former Socialist 
countries has almost always taken the worst of the 
market economy: privatisation has usually produced 
massive frauds and corruption. 
Everywhere around the world one may see the 
astounding facility with which the free market makes 
instruments of everyone and everything. The necessity 
of the market favours the diffusion of so-called 
capitalistic ‘ethics’ and ‘civilization’, even if they are not 
strictly necessary to market institutions. So, an insidious 
kind of colonization is at work, which people accustomed 
to different cultural values have come to hate with a 
passion. As mentioned before, not even the Western 
world can blindly trust the sorceries of the free market. 
A highly dynamic society is obliged to cultivate a 
diffuse solidarity and a deep sense of cooperation to 
defend individuals from uncertainty, precariousness, 
loneliness and frustrations, which rapid social change is 
wont to inflict on man. Here, contrary to appearance, we 
have a basic inconsistency of the present historical era 
with the idea of a spontaneous social order. Today, 
moreover, the virtues of public expenditure in recreating 
the structural consistency between production and 
socialization have disappeared, having the public deficit 
become a constraint instead of a stimulus to production. 
As we shall see later, such consistency now requires to 
make the market a mere mechanism of imputation of 
costs and efficiency. This is an important new 
organizational necessity of modern social systems.  The 
race for earnings may itself foster the worst misdeeds 
and has, from a moral standpoint, incredibly destructive 
power. We have seen that the ability on the part of 
market relations to furnish incentives, during the march 
towards the open, global society, was intensified when it 
came to be combined with non-ethical behaviour. Today 
it is ever- more indispensable to link market relations to 
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higher level of ethics. The global dynamic impulse of the 
separation of ethics from politics and economics in social 
thought and action is beginning to turn into an obstacle 
to the growth and development of human societies.  
The high level now attained by the general conditions 
of development and the growing social maturity of the 
masses make the persistent phenomenon of “power as 
domination” ever more indigestible, a factor of growing 
contradiction. The transition to “power as responsibility” 
is urgent in both politics and economics. One of the 
great merits of the market is its capacity for automatic, 
objective and inflexible attribution of accountability for 
the results of daily economic activity and decisions. But it 
is necessary to flank this responsibility with an equally 
objective and inescapable responsibility to the laws 
governing market relations, so as to avoid, for instance, 
bribery and corruption, which also undercut economic 
efficiency. The crucial imperative today is, again, to 
disengage the market from its inclination and ability to 
turn all of us and the world at large into its tools.  
Let us provide a set of solutions to this problem.  
 
4. Entrepreneurial Role and Profit Rate. The Public 
and Private Spheres Within the Working of the 
Market 
 
In this section we will identify some precise 
organizational requisites for the establishment of a 
wholesome entrepreneurial economy. Such a careful 
definition will enable us to combine our revisited model 
with diverse ideological options. 
We have just seen that modern economies cannot do 
without entrepreneurship and market relations; and that 
the market’s automatic, objective attribution of the 
entrepreneurial responsibility for action and decision is a 
precious device. Both in private and public companies 
(operating for the market), the only reliable indicator of 
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success and hence of responsibility is the profit rate.8 All 
other significant indices refer only to particular aspects of 
entrepreneurial action; they are partial and may 
accordingly become misleading. 
Various economic theories maintain that the 
entrepreneur is interested in total profit, not in the profit 
rate. But total profit is not a ratio of return; therefore, it 
does not represent an indicator of entrepreneurial 
success. The search for total profit demands that 
investments be ranked on the basis of their earning rate, 
if the global activity of the firm is constrained (as it 
always is) by the availability of some factor of 
production.9 But the profit rate is a good indicator of 
success only if it is obtained in a competitive market, not 
through monopoly, for competitive markets force the 
entrepreneur to engage in a ceaseless struggle for profit, 
and thus bind him to his function and his responsibilities. 
To avoid misunderstandings on this crucial matter, an 
important specification on the notion of competition is 
required. The competition based on the entrepreneur’s 
search for profit is the one considered here. It may also 
be intended as a combination of Kirzner’s “market 
process” and Schumpeter’s “creative destruction.”10 This 
notion of competition seems to be the only appropriate 
one in a discursive analysis of modern dynamic 
economies characterized by innovation and uncertainty. 
But a complication arises: successful innovation causes 
temporary monopoly. The complication is only apparent, 
however: in fact, an innovator’s monopoly does not 
                                                 
8 The well-known Lange and Lerner’s rules, that should drive 
the entrepreneurial behaviour in market socialism, make sense 
only in a static economy, that is excluding innovation and 
uncertainty. Therefore, they cannot be referred to reality. 
9This clearly appears from the formulation of a problem of 
optimisation under the constraint of the available 
entrepreneurial skills (or some other scarce factor).  
10 See I. M. Kirzner (1973) and J. A. Schumpeter (1954). 
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cause restrictions to competition, rather it is the engine 
of dynamic competition. Therefore, anti-monopolistic 
vigilance must not target this kind of monopoly, which 
will vanish as soon as the incumbent innovation will be 
undermined by a superior one –and that is, as soon as 
the benefits for the community deriving from the original 
innovation cease. In short, an innovator’s profits express 
the success achieved in the performance of 
entrepreneurial function, not a privilege.11 
Under this set-up it will be important to prevent that 
entrepreneurs falsify the accounts with a view to 
showing larger than actual profits, and so deceive 
bankers and other financiers. In public firms, such 
falsifications may also be triggered by the aim of 
avoiding blame. The greatest watchfulness is therefore 
required.12 Some standard corporate accounting 
                                                 
11 In Neoclassical economics, price competition results in 
allocative efficiency.  However, this is a result of comparative 
statics as opposed to a dynamic process.  This is like taking a 
series of pictures--the economy that results is stationary: it 
does not move--the process by which we go from one point to 
another is an illusion, just as a motion picture provides the 
illusion of movement.  However, since the movement from one 
point to another is not considered, the efficiency that results is 
one that is based only in the moment and is, thus, a stationary 
efficiency.  The notion of competition relevant in this context 
does not imply such stationary efficiency.  Indeed, neoclassical 
competition is almost senseless; a stationary economy does 
not need the market. 
12In workers self-managed firms the falsifications are 
stimulated by the interest of workers to increase their earnings. 
A way of exaggerating profits may consist in the 
underestimation of capital depreciation and, on the part of 
banks, in the concealment of the losses due to the insolvency 
of the financed concerns. But these manipulations (directed to 
hide losses) will depress profit rates of the successive years, 
since they will cause a fictitious growth of capital, and will thus 
force the firms performing those tricks to feed a growing fraud 
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procedures have been devised at the EU level to 
facilitate monitoring and gauging corporate profitability. 
Other controls on corporate results are used for tax 
purposes. It is important to perfect them. We shall see 
that the main difficulties in auditing business accounts 
are due to the confusion and complications of 
international relations. The situation is aggravated by 
widespread bad faith. In effect, the alarming frauds 
reported in the press are possible only because of the 
“kindness” of the authorities, which turn a blind eye; such 
complicity must be harshly repressed. 
The basic characteristics of the market as set forth 
here do not, at first glance, imply any theoretical 
innovation. However, their strict essentiality has 
substantial analytical value. Our model implies the 
unrestricted possibility of combining the market 
mechanism with a large number of different institutional, 
ideological and relational forms. In particular, our 
concise analytical foundations allow us to deal with the 
problem of property free from prejudice, inhibition and 
mystification, making evident that private ownership may 
be severely limited by public firms operating in the 
market without damage to efficiency and with some 
important advantages for social justice and the control of 
the overall rate of accumulation, and thus of aggregate 
demand. For in this kind of firm, profit serves only as the 
indicator of entrepreneurial success, which should 
determine whether the managers are kept on or 
discharged, and not as the vehicle for personal 
enrichment or unconstrained speculation.  
As is well known, private property is one of the 
institutions that have vaunted, in the course of recent 
centuries, the greatest merits and demerits. It has been 
at one and the same time a great source of freedom and 
                                                                                     
over time, which would become  increasingly more difficult to 
conceal.  
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of oppression. It has been the main barrier against the 
stifling domination of public institutions, it has stimulated 
pluralism, it has been an important source of individual 
incentive, and it has constituted an important defensive 
shield of personal independence. At the same time, it 
has greatly stimulated and inculcated greed and it has 
been a formidable means for the exploitation of man by 
man, and for countless other abominations. Moreover, it 
has fostered an enormous concentration of power. How 
are we to separate virtues from drawbacks, to preserve 
the former and eliminate the latter?  
This problem largely coincides with the question of 
delimiting the appropriate sphere for private property, 
while guaranteeing freedom and justice for all citizens.  
We can set out a general principle: private property 
should be preserved in so far as it promotes productive 
efficiency, the satisfaction of citizens and the full 
appreciation of their qualities and aspirations, without 
implying the creation of dominant positions. Both durable 
and non-durable consumption should be included in the 
sphere of private property, in particular homes, gardens 
and intensively cultivated plots of land. Moreover, small 
farms, craft and commercial enterprises, whose success 
is difficult to monitor and hence to control, should be 
privately run. For efficient performance, these firms need 
the dedication that comes from private ownership and 
private appropriation of profits. And as these firms are 
small, they do not imply dominant positions.  
In this economic system, everyone can consume 
what he wishes, as the search for profit will push firms, 
driven by prices, to satisfy consumers’ preferences. Here 
the question of new goods and the manipulation of 
demand through advertisement arises. The introduction 
of new goods and services is of critical importance for 
consumers since it broadens their range of choice. 
Furthermore, in the absence of new products, 
consumption would be saturated and the economy 
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would stagnate. The entrepreneur produces new goods 
if he thinks they will be bought. But new goods require 
advertisement to inform people of their existence. What 
must be condemned is false, misleading advertisement, 
not informative publicity. It is undeniable that the 
purpose of publicity is always to influence consumers. 
But the purpose of any message whatever is always to 
influence the listener. The only guarantee against the 
risk that such influence may create a dominant position, 
which jeopardizes freedom, is pluralism. 
 
5. The Cycle of Production and Distribution within 
the Market Operating as a Pure Mechanism of 
Imputation of Costs and Efficiency 
 
We are about the broach the core of our reformist 
proposal. Its goal is to delineate the widest possible 
bounds of social equality, in ways that are consistent 
with freedom, efficiency and development: in other 
words, we are seeking to find the preconditions 
guaranteeing the highest degree of social equality that 
modern society may achieve.13 The pursuit of these aims 
requires the transformation of the market into a pure 
mechanism of imputation of costs and efficiency. Such a 
transformation needs the establishment of a special 
fund; therefore some preliminary considerations are 
necessary to clarify the nature of this fund. 
The rapport of economics and social science vis-à-vis 
the market is twofold: on the one hand, the market has 
been considered as a potent vector of immorality, 
instability and social precariousness, and because of 
                                                 
13 The treatment of this topic bears some resemblance to J. 
Rawls’ investigation (see J. Rawls 1971); but our analysis is 
more specific and operative than that of this author, it being 
specifically concentrated on the concrete management of 
market relationships. 
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this, many have called for its wholesale abolition; on the 
other, the market has been understood as an institution 
indispensable to the efficiency of production, which, at 
most, is allegedly thought of requiring but the 
complement of social welfare to run perfectly. We saw 
that the first course of action is completely senseless in 
modern dynamic societies, while the second perspective 
appears nowadays utterly insufficient.14  
We wish to offer a different model, which operates a 
profound transformation of the market mechanism, and 
which is predicated, among other things, on the creation 
of a special fund. This fund of community wealth should 
enable the system to conjugate the achievement of the 
highest possible productive efficiency with freedom in 
the distribution of income. More precisely, it will be 
proved that this fund is crucial to the pursuit of four main 
aims: business efficiency, distributive justice, full 
employment, and individual autonomy. As far as we can 
tell, there is no example of such a fund in the present 
and past ages. Let see how our suggested model 
functions by starting with production. 
In this model, the firm buys the goods, factors of 
production and services required by its productive 
decisions on the market, at market price, just as it does 
today. But it does not pay wages; instead it pays the 
price of labour as computed by work offices on the basis 
of the demand and supply of the various types of 
                                                 
14  The debate on market Socialism in the years between the 
two world wars, was hinged on the hypothesis of a stationary 
economy, which does not need entrepreneurship, and thus 
made room for the formulation both of a centralized model of 
the economy, as that elaborated by E. Barone in the essay on 
“The Minister of Production in the Collectivist State,” as well as 
of that of a decentralized model of market socialism, with the 
manager’s decision–making simply dictated by Lange, Lerner 
and Taylor’s rule. (See A. P. Lerner 1938, O. Lange and F. M. 
Taylor 1938). 
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labour15 into what we may call a “fund of community 
wealth.” However, the firm may pay incentives to its 
workers and also overtime, if it deems it advantageous. 
Moreover, companies will pay into the fund a penalty 
for any damages to the environment; conversely, they 
should receive contributions for any social benefits 
deriving from their action. Firms are also taxed. Finally, 
they may have to pay into the fund a surplus over 
regular labour cost to assist the transfer of workers from 
the district of origin. The purpose of this is to stimulate 
capital to flow toward labour, so as to minimize the 
effects of uprooting, congestion and urbanization 
generated by migration. 
At the end of the production phase, the firm will sell 
output at market prices. With the proceeds, it will cover 
constant and variables costs, including capital 
depreciation and costs on borrowing, as well as taxation. 
The difference between revenue and costs, divided by 
capital employed, yields the profit rate. 
In addition to incentives and overtime paid directly by 
the firm, workers are entitled to a portion of the fund of 
community wealth. The determination of this portion and 
its distribution among social groups will follow criteria 
defined outside the firms, in the political sphere and 
through negotiations among social groups and their 
representatives. The share of each occupational group 
in income distribution may also depend, in part, on 
supply and demand for each kind of labour 
specialization; that is, each group’s share may be 
augmented or decreased, depending on whether 
demand for that type of labour is greater or less than 
                                                 
15 As is well known, demand and supply give, by themselves, 
relative prices. So, to obtain the prices of nominal labour it is 
necessary to refer to some labour price expressed in money 
units or, taking variations, refer to initial prices expressed in 
money units. 
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supply. In this way, the balance between labour demand 
and supply will be fostered by variations of supply, not 
only by the reaction of demand to changes in the price of 
labour. Each worker will be entitled to receive, from the 
fund of community wealth, a compensation proportional 
to his working time (but not overtime work, which as 
noted is paid by the firm) multiplied by the hourly 
compensation for his skill. To reduce transactions, firms 
themselves may pay this compensation, deducting it 
from their payments to the fund of community wealth. 
At the end of each year, along with the share of 
output to distribute to labour in the next year, the 
average gain in labour productivity will be calculated and 
the share of that increase to be allocated to labour 
income and the share allocated to a reduction in working 
time, will be set. This allocation converts technological 
progress into higher labour income and free time, not 
unemployment.  
People look for jobs by direct contact with firms and 
following the suggestions of labour exchanges, which 
have the knowledge of the demand and supply 
conditions for various skills (because they monitor 
demand and supply in order to set the price of each skill 
that firms have to pay into the fund of community 
wealth). Everyone chooses the job he finds more 
gratifying (by the type of activity, responsibility, distance 
from home etc.) and, if he is satisfied, he will keep his 
job; otherwise he will continue to search for more 
satisfactory employment. In case of collective 
dismissals, due for instance to a firm’s closing or 
downsizing, the dismissed labourers will receive benefits 
for the time needed to find another job. 
We can see that this model does not consider labour 
as a commodity that wage earners sell to the firm but as 
a service to productive system that entitles the worker to 
share in income generated. To prevent people from 
choosing not to work, in fact, the principle must be that 
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except for those unable to work, the condition for a 
person to share in the community’s income is that he be 
employed. 
In this organization of production, large-scale long-
term unemployment is prevented by the perfect flexibility 
of the price of labour with respect to demand and supply 
for various skills. As the price paid by firms for the use of 
labour skills is determined by the labour exchange on 
the basis of supply and demand,  a labour glut would 
drive down its price and cost, and thus stimulates firms 
(in the search for profit) to employ more labour and 
adopt capital-saving technology. The opposite happens 
if labour is scarce. This should push labour demand and 
supply toward equilibrium16. The tendency is 
strengthened if the education system produces versatile 
workers, enabling people to find various kinds of 
gratifying jobs. But to move the economy toward full 
employment it is also necessary to pay attention (to this 
we will return in the next section) to guaranteeing the 
equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply. This 
need is particularly strong in modern dynamic societies, 
with their continuous local and global changes and 
adjustments. Even more, one must consider that 
knowledge and its evolution come largely from 
experience; 17 so that people excluded from the 
productive process are also excluded from important 
channels of knowledge and will be increasingly unable to 
avoid marginalization and alienation. 
                                                 
16 Sraffa’s demonstration of the re-switch of techniques is not 
relevant in this context, it only shows the erroneousness of the 
notion of average period of production and of the explanation 
of the interest rate on the basis of capital productivity; 
moreover, it makes the hypothesis that wage rate is 
exogenous, that disregards the relation between wage rate and 
the supply and demand of labour. 
17 M. Polanyi’s  pioneering insistence on tacit knowledge has 
provided a deep and extensive illustration of this aspect. 
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It may be useful, at this point, for a better 
comprehension of the proposed revision of market 
dynamics, to work out a more extensive critique of some 
important aspects of the existing economic systems and 
ideologies, in the light of this very model.  
If, as in the capitalist order, the distribution of income 
between labour and capital is the result of the clash 
between wage earners and firms, unemployment cannot 
be eradicated. For employers, to counter unions and 
working people’s demands, do, in fact, use the infallible 
weapon of unemployment. If profits are low or firms incur 
losses, dismissals rise to crush labour’s pretensions. 
And in dynamic economies, firms may also try, with the 
help of technical progress, to save on labour where it 
causes rigidities. It is senseless to found protection of 
labour on laws, norms and  rules that oppose the 
mobility of labour: indeed, such legislation is one of the 
key impediments to the increase in employment. 
It seems clear that the establishment of a fully flexible 
labour market, which is indispensable in modern 
dynamic economy, requires the abolition of wages set at 
the company and collective bargaining level. This is all 
the more urgent in that ordinary collective bargaining 
does cause inefficiencies in the use of labour and make 
unemployment physiological. Uniformity of national wage 
agreements and some other rigidities swell the 
underground economy in the areas where labour 
productivity is too low for the national wage rate. These 
illegal activities allow a fierce exploitation of workers, 
who have no protection whatever. And the worst of it is 
that this underground economy is often the only 
alternative to unemployment. 
Trade unions must seriously consider the severe 
restraints on their bargaining power. They may win as 
long as the claims of labour lubricate the entrepreneurial 
system, as wages, increasing in step with productivity 
gains, stimulate consumption, hence sales, and 
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eventually lead to an improvement in the condition of the 
working in the name of social peace and efficiency. But 
as soon as profits fall, unions find it impossible to force 
employers to pay higher wages. In substance, the game 
of wage bargaining is always dominated by the 
employers, who are most often propelled by competition, 
avidity and unscrupulous behaviour. It is surprising that 
trade unions, whose function is to defend labour, have 
not understood that the root of exploitation is the 
institution of wage labour itself. It is a misfortune that the 
distribution of income is so largely determined by wage 
earnings. 
Conflict between labour and capital over wage rates 
is the worst possible method of income distribution and 
works as a powerful obstacle to production. The task of 
firms is to produce material wealth and create jobs. They 
should be able to do so without being plagued by the 
perennial conflict with labour, which may be seen as an 
inappropriate social conflict since it takes place in the 
wrong place. Income policies to remedy the conflict 
demonstrate the failure of the company wage approach. 
They are a rather tortuous way of establishing some kind 
of income distribution more rational than that implied by 
the “labour market”. It is crucial to bring income 
distribution outside the firm, as far as this is possible. 
This is indispensable to full employment and company 
efficiency consistent with social justice and individual 
autonomy. Trade unions should oversee health and 
safety at the work place. They should fight for the 
distribution of the fund of common wealth, but not for the 
company wage. 
Let me also point out that the idea of the workers’ 
self-management18 of the firm is mistaken. And the 
                                                 
18 Where «workers have control over the production process in 
the enterprise in which they work, since they have ultimate 
authority, one-person, one-vote, on the enterprise itself» See 
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workers’ remuneration based on firms’ results is a 
vehicle of inequalities and managerial degeneracies. 
Firms must be managed by entrepreneurs, and must not 
be involved in the struggle over income distribution. 
Entrepreneurs’ ability in decision-making and innovating 
must not be constrained by the decision-power of 
incompetent persons. The entrepreneur must be 
responsible in terms of results, i.e. profit rate, not 
subjected to the command of a non-entrepreneurial 
body. Besides, the rational organization of the economy 
requires that firms pay for the resources they utilize, 
including labour, at prices determined by supply and 
demand. This is a fundamental rule of efficiency, 
indispensable both to rational use of the resources 
available and to defeating unemployment. Income 
distribution is a totally different matter, one that concerns 
society as a whole. The usual forms of wage bargaining 
obstruct efficient utilization of resources and prevent far-
seeing policies of distribution of wealth. Such bargaining 
is the product of spontaneous evolution, a sort of 
“primitive” organizational form of society. An advanced 
society should be able to supplant those institutions with 
better thought-out organizational forms. 
Moreover, the strict link between the production and 
distribution of income -or, more precisely, the fact that 
the distributive conflict affects business accounts, 
seriously undermines the firms’ investment, as well as 
economic growth and employment. Aggregate 
investment must be determined by the community and 
as part of the process of income distribution. This aspect 
will be clarified by discussing how firms should be 
financed. 
In conclusion, it should be clear that income 
distribution concerns the entire society and that even 
                                                                                     
D. Schweickart, in Market Socialism (1998), edited by B. 
Ollman, Routledge, New York and London, p. 127. 
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production is a social entity since it depends on 
productive forces engendered by society, such as 
techniques and knowledge. Some ingenuous theories of 
exchange value have long maintained that there is an 
unbreakable connection between income production and 
distribution. But no such connection exists, except the 
part due to incentives and the fact that income 
distribution influences production through the propensity 
to consume.   
In particular, it is senseless to attribute to exchange 
value an ethic-ideological content as, for instance, the 
labour-value theory does. The statement value=labour 
makes some sense only in a stationary economy. In an 
economy based on innovation, wealth is, for a large part, 
a result of creativity, genius, and of the entrepreneurial 
search and intuition. Price is, therefore, a completely 
different thing from labour-value, and there is no bridge 
between the two. Really, exchange value displays only 
the mere functional price role. Precisely, it acts as an 
indicator of productive opportunities and relative 
abundance, and as a means to make homogeneous a 
multiplicity of commodities physically different from each 
other; its role is thus to facilitate comparison and 
exchange among these goods. So the ethic and 
ideological flavour of the labour-value hypothesis, with 
its implications on income distribution, expresses not 
only a limiting but also a senseless formulation of the 
much wider ethical and ideological problem. 
The organization of production, distribution and 
exchange as discussed here attributes a social content 
both to income production and to distribution. Moralists 
and social reformers have always considered the market 
a gymnasium for corruption and aggressiveness, a place 
of violent contrasts among men, an open space for 
selfishness and fraud; in brief, it’s been depicted as one 
of the worst instruments of domination, oppression and 
exploitation of man by man. But we have seen that the 
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market can be shorn of these unpleasant attributes and 
transformed into a mere mechanism for the imputation of 
costs and the stimulus to efficiency through prices, which 
serve to signal the availability of each commodity. We 
have also seen that the market mechanism, aided by 
competition, and combined with a profit rate as an 
indicator of success (which, as such, allows 
accountability) can be a highly effective mechanism for 
stimulating efficient decision- making and management 
in the absence of monopolistic privileges and under the 
clear and inescapable rule of law (designed to prevent 
bribes and other abuses). The disconnection of the 
market mechanism from the struggle for income 
distribution makes for efficiency, individual initiative and 
social justice, and may thus be relied upon to turn 
selfishness into healthy rivalry. 
 
6. Interest Rate, Production Financing and Effective 
Demand 
 
A reformist agenda aimed at the overhaul (if not the 
transformation) of the capitalist economy would be 
clearly incomplete without a critique of the most capitalist 
trait of all: the rate of interest and the rhythm of financial 
capital. By clarifying the nature of these instruments’ 
role, we will open to the door to a  reform of the process 
of capital accumulation and of the system of corporate 
finance. 
The rate of interest has been considered, in the 
course of history, as an unjust appropriation of revenue 
by capital owners. The dispute on its permissibility 
reached a paroxysm in the Medieval age–in times 
marked by the florescence of mercantile activity—and 
was mainly driven by the conflict that arose between 
Christian ethics and the business drift. The phenomenon 
of interest continued to loom largely throughout the 
turbulent transition that led to the advent of the modern 
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world: and the tragic irony is that this turbulent episode, 
from an organizational point of view, turned out to be a 
gigantic, sad waste of life and time, as shall be seen 
hereafter. 
The suspicion of there being foul play and 
manipulation behind the eternal vicissitudes of monetary 
dynamics seems corroborated by the spasmodic 
variability of the rate of interest in the course of history; 
rates always appear painfully high within societies 
chronically afflicted by misery and stagnant production. 
Homer has dedicated a ponderous study to the history of 
interest rates.19 The first development of banking, in 
Medieval Italy, acted like a brake on the surge of interest 
rates, which indeed fell in this country to levels between 
10 and 20 per cent, while in the British isles and 
Germany they shot to levels as high as 100 per cent. In 
the late fourteenth century, Italian interest rates on 
commercial loans hovered around 8 per cent, with a 
minimum of 5 per cent, and in the fifteenth century an 
average of 5 per cent prevailed in Germany. A century 
later, interest rates between 4 and 12 per cent were 
frequent in Italy, Antwerp and Lyons. The historian C. 
Cipolla has documented that the Genoa’s financial 
powerhouse, the Banco of San Giorgio, charged interest 
and discount rates of 5 per cent in the fifteenth century 
and little above 1 per cent a century late20. The wars of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries caused a rise of 
the rates, but the seventeenth witnessed a new fall: in 
the Netherlands interests reached 4 per cent and, by the 
end of the century, 3 per cent. The incessant 
development of the banking system was the main cause 
of these decreases. With the advent of the financial 
leadership of England, in the eighteenth century, long 
term government bond yields declined in that country 
                                                 
19 See S. Homer (1996) 
20  See C. M. Cipolla (1980) 
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towards 3 per cent and the usury laws reduced the 
maximum rate of interest to 5 per cent. In the nineteenth 
century, Britain’s long-term interest rates stabilized at 
around 3 per cent, while government bond yields 
reached 2 per cent by the end of the century. The wars 
that followed caused the rates to rise again. 
This course of business shows an inverse correlation 
between prosperity and interest rates; contrary to 
Homer’s opinion, it does not give the causal direction of 
the two phenomena; but the association of these is 
meaningful. True, low levels of interest stimulate growth, 
and they often stand thereby as an expression of 
prosperity. What is more important, however, is that 
since interest rates decrease with the development of 
banking, their level and their very existence come indeed 
to depend on the characteristics of the credit system 
itself. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that interest basically 
represents a deduction from profit; and it may partially 
be discharged at the expense of wages, which is a sure 
way of exacerbating social conflict. In any case, interest 
stifles entrepreneurial initiative. Can such an impediment 
to entrepreneurship be eliminated? Can  the ensuing 
deduction from labour-income be eliminated? Complex 
issue–marred by a host of misconceptions.  
To begin, problematic is the moralists’ and the 
political economists’ insistence (from Aquinas to Marx) 
on denying interest on the basis of the labour theory of 
value21 –a theory whose ultimate purpose seemed in fact 
that of shielding the exaction of interest. As set out 
earlier, such a theory is senseless. Therefore, the 
alternative justification for the rate of interest as the just 
                                                 
21  In the Tabula Exemplorum, a manuscript of the thirteenth 
century, it is written: «All men abstain from working in Sunday 
days, but usurer ones work incessantly», See J. Le Goff, La 
borsa e la vita, Laterza, Bari 1987, p. 24 
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fruit (reward) of capital productivity –indispensable to the 
equilibrium between the supply and demand of capital— 
could easily gain ground (as in Neoclassical and 
Austrian theories). But that justification is contradicted by 
a simple remark: capital productivity needs technical 
progress,22 which, for its part, has almost nothing to do 
with financial capital. Afterwards, the Sraffian discovery 
of the phenomenon of the ‘re-switch of techniques’ (that 
is the possibility that a rise in the rate of interest may 
imply an increase in the intensity of capital, instead of a 
decrease), undermined the thesis of Böhm-Bawerk’s 
average period of production, finishing off once and for 
all the fashionable models of capital productivity built 
upon Robinson Crusoe’s utopia. 
There exists a reasoning capable of solving the 
debate on interest and usury at once. We ask: is interest 
strictly necessary for productive and organizational 
efficiency? If it is not, the existence (and exaction) of 
interest is unnecessary, and we may thus safely 
conclude that interest represents an arbitrary and 
artificial form of income pocketed by the financial cartel. 
Is this the case? 
Tily has written: ‘If there is no necessary limit to the 
volume of credit/debt that can be created then it is 
essentially a free good. A rate of interest is a price, and 
prices are paid for scarce resources…. Interest becomes 
a social construct, to be manipulated according to the 
mandate, principles or interests of a country’s 
authorities’.23. 
I argue that we need an argument somewhat more 
stringent in this regard. 
Interest has not much to do with the equilibrium 
between supply and demand of capital. As a matter of 
                                                 
22 In the absence of technical progress, the accumulation 
process would push capital productivity toward zero. 
23  See G. Tily (2004), pp. 8 and 13. 
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fact, far more than on interest, saving depends on the 
amount of income gained and therefore on the level of 
production. And, on the other hand, the entrepreneurs’ 
demand for capital depends on entrepreneurship and the 
state of business, which is mainly expressed by profit 
expectations. The argument that the rate of interest is 
necessary in order to prevent ‘over-investment’ and the 
concomitant waste of capital is belied by the fact that 
such a role is as a rule fulfilled not by the interest rate 
but by profit rate, that is by (1) the entrepreneurial 
search for profit—i.e., the tendency to extract the highest 
rate of profit from investment—, and (2) by the gauge of 
accountability role of the profit rate (as discussed in 
section 3). All of the foregoing implies that the role of 
interest is simply to throttle entrepreneurship and to 
subtract income from distribution. It is, therefore, evident 
that, in principle, the share of income to be invested may 
be determined by the community abstracting from 
interest, and that, being the profit rate sufficient to 
impose a judicious use of capital, it is perfectly possible 
and efficient to share financing among the entrepreneurs 
at zero interest. In sum, there are no technical 
impediments to the abolition of interest rate through legal 
prohibition, i.e. by defining as usurious a positive real 
interest rate. 
Of course, within of a free international financial 
market, there would need to be a concerted agreement 
to abolish interest everywhere across the world. 
However, zero percent might encourage the tendency to 
hoard money; but this could be opposed through a low 
rate of inflation or some sort of Gesellian demurrage 
scheme on cash money. At any rate, nowadays the 
tendency to hoard seems to be almost irrelevant, since 
the variety of modern banking services manages to keep 
private consumption flowing in a perennial, and 
tumultuous flow. It is indeed remarkable that on the 
shoulders of a variable, as unnecessary, if not wholly 
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pernicious, as the interest rate, has grown an enormous, 
complicated and rather obscure economic body mainly 
devoted to speculation and entirely responsible for all 
the serious shocks and malfunctions of the global 
network. 
There remains, at this point, to try to delineate a 
blueprint for a financing system of production shorn of 
the negative and pervasive presence of interest –a 
blueprint capable, among other things, of clipping the 
wings of financial capital, stimulating entrepreneurship 
and contrasting the deficiency of global demand-. A 
discussion on the procedures to modify the banking 
system in accordance to what will follow is not relevant 
in this context, and a detailed analysis of the tricks and 
abuses of that system may form the theme of another 
paper. The important point is, at this juncture, to stress 
that the central function of the banking system, when it 
comes to fund production, needs to be radically 
modified. Financial capital was born not to serve 
production but to enslave it, and exploit the toiling 
community into the bargain. This distortion needs to be 
redressed at once. My proposal, born as a reaction 
against the undue appropriation of wealth perpetrated by 
the financial oligarchy, is presented here in a fashion as 
simple and transparent as possible. 
Every year the community should define the share of 
value added to assign to consumption and investment, 
and to investment in selected strategic sectors. After 
that, care must be taken to ensure, through stimulus and 
instructions to the banking system, that these 
prescriptions are executed, as each investment is at the 
discretion of the businesses. 
The capital required by the firms will come, in the first 
place, from profits. The uninvested portion of a firm’s 
profits may be set aside for future investment. But the 
financing of capital must generally exceed the reinvested 
profits, so as to allow the formation of new firms and the 
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financing of the firms’ investment plans in excess of 
gross profit. Such extra accumulation may be covered in 
part by private saving, which should yield a real interest 
rate of zero percent.24 But savers should not be allowed 
to buy shares directly, since the stock exchange is much 
worse than a gambling house, as we shall shown in the 
next section. The rest of the funds required to achieve 
the planned rate of accumulation will be provided by the 
fund of common wealth, which should channel the 
residual quota to the banking system, to be distributed 
among firms.  
Each bank’s application to the fund for resources 
should be judged on the basis of the profit rate. In fact, 
bankers must be obliged to operate as entrepreneurs, 
and their commercial tenure must depend on business 
results. The more successful they are, as expressed by 
the profit rate, the more capital will be granted by the 
fund of common wealth via their commercial bank. 
Banks’ profits should derive from the prices of the 
services that they offer to their customers; competition 
should keep these prices low. 
A substantial feature of such a reform would be the 
creation of a mechanism directed to the achievement, 
through the firms’ investment, of the yearly rate of 
accumulation projected by the community, so that to 
avoiding or reducing substantially the possibility of a 
deficiency of global demand. It would also act as a 
stimulus to entrepreneurship. A major condition for the 
effectiveness of the mechanism is that bankers provide 
sufficient credit to firms to achieve the community’s 
projected accumulation rate. Therefore, if the banks’ 
                                                 
24 A real interest rate of 0 per cent on saving would actually be 
a bargain for savers. These in the course of time have 
generally suffered a continuous devaluation of their savings 
owing to inflation, fraud and robbery, which in turn are mainly 
caused by speculation on financial markets.   
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requests for capital do not exhaust the fund set aside for 
accumulation, the difference should be assigned 
compulsorily to banks (say in proportion to the amount 
each has requested), for distribution among investing 
firms. This implies that, if the propensity to invest is low, 
banks will be forced to lower the prices for their services 
so that all the funds allotted to them for investment may 
be placed with the applicant firms. Vice versa, if the 
amount of capital provided by the fund of common 
wealth is lower than the total applications of banks 
based on the firms’ borrowing, the negative difference 
will be deducted from those requests, in inverse 
proportion to their profit rates. This guideline of equality 
between the allocations for saving and investment is of 
crucial importance for the control of aggregate demand; 
in particular, it moderates the cyclical effects of 
entrepreneurial euphoria or pessimism. Moreover, it 
stimulates entrepreneurship since, when demand for 
credit is slack, firms may obtain inexpensive loans, as 
banks are required to loan funds up to the accumulation 
target. So banks are induced to make golden bridges to 
entrepreneurship, as it were. 
If the propensity to invest is low, the duty to attain the 
established aggregate rate of accumulation may cause 
heavy losses to the banking system. But this does not 
represent a problem for public firms, for which the profit 
rate is only an indicator of success; in fact, the relative 
degree of success may also be expressed by the inverse 
of the rate of loss.  
 
7. On the International Economic Order 
 
On the international plane, the absurdities of 
capitalism – and the urgency of a remedy therefor- 
appear even more starkly than do as when contemplated 
from the national angle. In fact, the growing integration 
of world markets, which has given rise to the global 
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society, multiplies the distortions, opacity and larceny so 
characteristic of the “free market”. Speculation shifts 
enormous masses of capital instantaneously around the 
world. There isn’t any supranational authority deputed to 
discipline these activities or prevent the crises provoked 
by such massive transfers of ‘hot money’. Some codes 
of conduct have been devised as remedies, but 
unfortunately speculators are clever in crafting tricks to 
elude them. Moreover, the evolution of financial 
instruments and markets systematically makes these 
guidelines obsolete. In effect, it is most difficult to obtain 
reliable information and craft control instruments in a 
sphere dominated by uncertainty and rapid change to an 
extraordinary degree. As a consequence, the 
concentration of enormous wealth in private hands 
enables the holders to carry out gigantic frauds, e.g. the 
sale or dismemberment of healthy concerns at very low 
prices through manufactured crises. Public ownership of 
large companies and the model of accumulation set out 
above would greatly facilitate the exertion of controls and 
impede speculation. 
It is most desirable to deter or prevent savers from 
engaging themselves in speculation in a landscape full 
of snares like the international capital markets. Firms 
should also be discouraged from dabbling in speculation, 
which distorts and denatures the imperatives of 
production and the accountability role of the profit rate. 
The vices of the international market are aggravated 
by the selfish myopia of international economic 
institutions –those institutionally appointed to aiding 
countries in economic difficulty, usually the less 
developed economies. The so-called Washington 
Consensus hinges on three recommendations: 
privatisation, austerity and openness to the international 
market. But it is short-sighted as well as cynical to 
require that, to get aid, the less developed countries 
must enact policies to balance the budget, put their 
Fusari: Non-Capitalist Monetary System             121 
international accounts back in order, open up the 
international goods and capital market, and proceed to 
privatise all that is public. Macroeconomic stabilisation 
centering on monetary and fiscal restrictions, which free-
trade and the free capital market make particularly 
harsh, yields high interest rates and the contraction of 
demand, both of which throttle entrepreneurship and 
force large-scale bankruptcy. All this reduces output and 
employment, and increases the share of the population 
dependent on welfare. The disaster is completed by 
usurious interest rates on short-term loans, which must 
be complemented by reserve funds yielding much lower 
interest rates. During the 1997 crisis in East Asia, the 
IMF ratcheted up its rate by 25 points: a real disaster for 
production. Again, it is disheartening to see how interest, 
a variable that is technically useless, comes to play such 
an important and destructive role. Significantly, an 
economist well versed in the operation of international 
economic institutions like Stiglitz, has harshly criticized 
those policies.25 These avoid the true problem, i.e. 
rebuilding the economy by stimulating efficiency and a 
sense of duty predicated on a system of clear 
responsibilities. The promotion of entrepreneurship, and 
public entrepreneurship in particular, is ignored, while 
privatisations are often nothing but the theft of public 
capital. In the recent past, various underdeveloped 
countries have tried to stimulate economic growth by 
promoting state industries through central planning. The 
failure of those efforts opened the door to privatisation. 
Many State industries in Russia ended up in private 
hand almost for nothing, even when they could have 
operated efficiently as public firms, had they been 
subjected to the accountability of the profit rate and the 
associated restructuring process. 
                                                 
25 See J. E. Stiglitz (2002). 
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The policies enforced by the international institutions 
have had disastrous effects in the underdeveloped 
countries, where an entrepreneurial spirit is generally 
lacking and the ruling class is much more prone to 
dissipation, robbery and oppression than to production 
and innovation. With their systems of patronage and 
clientele they have perpetuated a corrupt power 
structure and condemned their masses to hunger. 
Production should not be stifled by the class conflict 
over distribution. It should not be disturbed by the 
bitterness, the agitation and the despair of 
underdeveloped countries, or be troubled by 
unrestrained speculation, mainly to the detriment of 
working people. International institutions should not offer 
aid to keep big speculators from going bankrupt. Instead, 
they should ask, as a condition for aid: systems of 
accountability based on well-defined criteria of success 
and, in synthesis, the creation of an efficient, transparent 
system of economic power capable of production and 
administration, in lieu of governments dominated by 
adventurers, arrogant dictatorships, or confusing 
systems of law that only encourage abuse. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
One of the chief economic problems of the West has 
been its increasing reliance on a strange sense of 
sublimated superiority, which it has erroneously imputed 
to the most proximate origin of its wealth: the capitalist 
market. The inference is mistaken in that the source of 
this wealth, whatever the merits and demerits of its 
nature and uses, lies in human ingenuity rather than in 
the capitalist machine, whose essentially constrictive 
and feudal countenance has come, fraudulently, to 
represent western economy as a whole. But capitalism is 
not western inventiveness as a whole; it is but a 
proprietary scheme that has usurped all the fruits of 
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western creation. And this tragic qui pro quo, has led the 
West to clash violently with the rest of the world.  In 
truth, the capitalist system is the source of so many 
disadvantages to the westerners themselves: namely, 
social injustice, poisoned labour relations and the threat 
to human dignity, social and geographical disequilibria, 
the wideness of fluctuations, the sorceries and 
distortions promoted by the hegemony of finance capital, 
and finally the smothering of entrepreneurship, freedom 
and growth. 
The present essay has attempted to show a possible 
way to remedy these ills, in particular the pervasive and 
distorting influence of the current market and financial 
systems. Our aim was to devise a model that couples 
efficiency with social justice, structural consistency with 
innovation; a system able to eliminate speculation and 
unnecessary (if not senseless) strife, while preserving 
the conflicts implicit in the very functioning of a dynamic 
society, such as the battle between innovators and 
conservatives. And we have shown that a proper 
functioning of the market is not inconsistent with man’s 
noble propensities, and that it may very well reduce 
fraud and greed.  
The necessary set of conditions to achieve this goal 
consists of: 1) the reduction of the market to a mere 
mechanism for imputation of costs and of efficiency, 2) 
an expansion of the sphere in which public firms are 
allowed to operate within the market, 3) and a drastic 
reform of the banking system. More in particular, we 
have dwelled on: the essential role of the profit rate as 
an instrument of accountability for all concerns (public 
and private); the means of re-building a non-capitalistic 
economic body with a free market; and a model of 
capital accumulation able to stimulate entrepreneurship, 
and to achieve the aggregate accumulation rate –a rate 
to be set by the community, with a view to eliminating 
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the tumorous growth of overheard and interest charges 
and the volatile disasters of finance capital.  
The final section on the international market and 
disequilibria, wrought by the devilries of international 
finance, is but a beckoning call to drift toward a different 
conception of market economics, and a simpler and 
more transparent financial system than the dominant 
one, which is largely ridden by speculation, the 
concentration of power and the exploitation of the weak.  
Bibliography 
 
 Barone, E. (1971), “The minister of production in the 
collectivist state”, In Value, prices and general equilibrium, 
edited by G. Lunghini, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
 Cipolla C. M. (1980), Economic history of preindustrial 
Europe, Italian edition, Il Mulino, Bologna     
       Dobb, M. H. (1933), “Economic theory and the 
problem of socialist economy”, Economic Journal 
        Fusari, A (1992), “Entrepreneurship, Market 
Process and Economic Development. Some Theoretical 
and Empirical Insights useful for Managing the Transition 
Period”. In: Transition to advanced market economies. 
Edited by W Owsinski, J Stefanski and A Straszak, The 
Association of Polish Operational Research Societies.  
 Fusari, A. (1996), “Development and Organization of 
Social Systems. An Interpretation of  Historical 
Processes”, Italian edition, Sociologia n° 1 
 Fusari, A. (2004), “A reconsideration on the method of 
economic and social sciences. Procedures, rules, 
classifications”. International Journal of Social Economics, 
vol. 31 5/6. 
 Gerschenkron, A. (1952), Economic backwardness in 
historical perspective, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
 Hodgson, G. M. (1988), Economics and Institutions: a 
Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics, Polity 
Press, Cambridge 
Fusari: Non-Capitalist Monetary System             125 
 Homer, S. (1996), History of interest rates, Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick New Jersey 
 Ibn Khaldun (1958),  The maqaddimah (An 
introductory to history), Routledge & Kagan Paul, London 
 Kirzner, M.I. (1973), Competition and  
Entrepreneurship. The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London 
 Lange, O. and F. M. Taylor, (1938), On the economic 
theory of socialism, Edited by B. Lippincot, Minneapolis 
 Lerner, A. P. (1938), “Theory and practice in socialist 
economics“, The Review of Economic Studies. 
 Marx, K.(1977), Il Capitale, Editori Riuniti, Roma 
 Mandeville, B. ( 2000),  The Fable of the Bees, Italian 
edition, Laterza, Bari 
 Mises von L. (1946), “Economic calculus in the 
socialist state”, In Economic collectivist planning, Edited by 
F.A. Hayek 
 Ollman, B. (1998) edited by, Market Socialism. The 
debate among socialists, Routledge, New York and 
London 
 Polanyi, K, (1957) edited by, Trade and market in the 
early empires, Economies in history and theory, The Free 
Press 
 Polanyi, K. (1944), The great transformation, Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston Inc. New York  
 Polanyi, M. (1966), The Tacit Dimension, Garden City, 
NY, Doubleday 
 Rawls, J (1971), A theory of justice, The Belknap 
Press, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
 Rostow, W. W. (1990), Theorists of economic growth 
from D. Hume to the present, with a perspective on the 
next century, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 
 Saviotti, P. P. and Metcalfe, J. S.(1991), Edited by, 
Evolutionary Theories of Economic and technological 
Change, Harwood Academic Publisher 
 Schumpeter, J. A. (1954), Capitalism, socialism and 
democracy, Allen & Unwin,  London 
126             American Review of Political Economy 
 
 Smith, A. (1976), An inquiry into the nature and 
causes of the wealth of nations, Italian edition, ISEDI, 
Milan   
 Sraffa, P. (1960), Production of commodities by 
means of commodities, Cambridge University Press 
 Stiglitz, J. E. (2002), Globalization and its discontents, 
Italian edition, Einaudi, Turin 
 Tily, G. (2004), “The socialisation of interest”, paper 
presented at the AHE conference, Leeds 
 
Contact info: 
Angelo Fusari 
Piazza dell’Indipendenza 4 
00185 Rome 
e-mail: a.fusari@isae.it 
 
 
                127 
American Review of Political Economy, Vol. 3(1), Pages 127-163. 
March 2005 
 
© 2005 American Review of Political Economy 
Coalition Governments: Fiscal Implication 
for the Indian Economy  
 
Mala Lalvani♣ 
University of Mumbai 
 
Abstract 
 
The Indian polity has been through 43 coalition 
governments at the state level between 1966/67 and 
1998/99. In the present study we attempt to examine 
what this change in form of government from single party 
to coalitions has meant for the economy. The results of 
our study which examines the post 1980 period give us 
reason to be optimistic. Coalitions at the state 
government level appear to have, on an average, done 
well to increase capital expenditures particularly capital 
expenditures on social services and other developmental 
categories. They have, however, not succeeded in 
taking politically hard decisions of curbing revenue 
expenditures and revenue deficits. It is our contention 
that the weak majority of coalition governments is their 
major strength. The tenuous hold of coalitions on power 
gives them a license for undertaking reforms. If the 
opportunity is taken to undertake the more ‘politically 
difficult’ reforms to prune revenue expenditures then the 
‘era of coalitions’ would turn out to be a blessing in 
disguise for the Indian economy.   
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